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Abstract 
This paper relies on a sample of 9,419 acquisitions by 1,443 UK firms during 1988 to 2014 to 
investigate the impact of foreign acquisitions on corporate performance. Moreover, the moderating 
UROH RI ILUPV¶ SULRU H[SRVXUH WR IRUHLJQ PDUNHWV RQ WKH IRUHLJQ Dcquisition-performance link is 
explored. The paper finds that, on average, foreign acquisitions have a negative impact on corporate 
performance. However, the negative impact of foreign acquisitions disappears under two 
circumstances: (1) when domestic firms undertake foreign acquisitions; and (2) when highly 
experienced multinationals undertake foreign acquisitions. Collectively, the findings imply that the 
benefits (costs) associated with foreign acquisitions are greater (lower) for new entrants into foreign 
markets and for highly experienced multinationals.  
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1. Introduction  
Recent figures suggest that growth by international diversification continues to be an important 
strategic tool for firms. Global foreign direct investments rose by 9% to $1.45 trillion in 2013 and this 
surge in foreign direct investment was expected to continue to about $1.8 trillion in 2016. 
Furthermore, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD) reports that the 
100 largest corporations worldwide in 2013 had 59% of their assets and 65% of their sales in foreign 
markets. Importantly, the report reveals that a greater proportion of these foreign direct investments 
tend to be by means of mergers and acquisitions. These developments, perhaps, underscore the 
continuing relevance of posing the following questions: (1) What is the net impact of increasing levels 
of foreign acquisitions on key corporate performance measures that are of interest to managers? and 
(2) Is the net impact of foreign acquisitions on corporate performance higher or lower for firms with 
little or no experience in foreign markets? This paper attempts to find answers to these two related 
questions.  
Since foreign acquisitions represent an important vehicle for accessing foreign markets, they are 
likely to be associated with most of the benefits and costs of engaging in international business. While 
the value impact of engaging in international business has received some attention in the international 
business and management literature, not much attention has been paid to how the various modes of 
entering into foreign markets may influence the benefits/costs of international business activities, 
leading to mixed conclusions in the literature.1 Put differently, a bulk of these studies has implicitly 
assumed that the benefits and costs as well as the risks associated with international business activities 
are symmetric across the various modes of entry into foreign markets including exporting, joint 
venture, mergers and acquisitions, and greenfield investments (see e.g. Pangarkar, 2008; Lu & 
Beamish, 2001; Lu & Beamish, 2004). There has, therefore, been very little attempt by researchers to 
control for the mode of entry into foreign markets when investigating the internationalization-
performance link. Making a distinction between the value impact of the various modes of foreign 
market entry is important because Shimizu et al. (2004) and Agyei-Boapeah (2015) argue that while 
                                                          
1)RULQVWDQFH6XOOLYDQ¶VOLWHUDWXUHUHYLHZLQFOXGHGDERXWVWXGLHVRQWKLVWRSLFZLWKWKHHDUOLHVWVWXG\SXEOLVKHGLn 
1971.  
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internationalization can be achieved in a variety of ways (e.g. greenfield investments, foreign 
acquisitions, exports, formation of alliances and joint ventures), the risks/costs associated with the 
equity entry modes (e.g. foreign acquisitions and greenfield investments) far outweigh those of the 
non-equity entry modes (e.g. exports, formation of alliances, etc.). Thus, it is possible for some entry 
modes with lower costs/risks (e.g. exports) to lead to positive internationalization-performance link 
while others with greater costs/risks (e.g. foreign acquisitions) result in negative relationships. For 
instance, it is likely that political risks, coordination costs, as well as integration costs will be greater 
for firms that become international through the purchase of existing assets/firms in other countries, 
compared to those international firms that merely export to foreign countries. This is because while 
exporting firms may have little or no foreign assets in host countries, acquiring firms do establish a 
physical presence in host countries which imposes additional costs/risks/complexities such as 
increased risk of foreign asset expropriation (Agyei-Boapeah, 2015). Therefore, it is plausible for the 
relationship between internationalisation and performance to vary for the various modes of entering 
foreign markets. As a first step towards recognising the potential role of the mode of entry into 
foreign markets, this paper focuses on how a specific mode of entry into foreign markets (i.e. foreign 
DFTXLVLWLRQVPD\LPSDFWILUPV¶SHUIRUPDQFH 
In the interest of robustness and to focus on operational variables that are of much relevance to 
corporate managers, this article considers the impact of foreign acquisitions on four key performance 
measures: (1) the accounting-based return on assets (ROA); (2) the market-EDVHG7RELQ¶V44
operating cash-flow (OCF); and (4) operating cost. A key problem with the use of one or two 
performance measures is that the chosen measure may fail to be representative of firm performance at 
a point in time, especially if the objective function of majority of the sample firms is different from 
the chosen performance measure. As noted by Pangarkar (2008), most small- and medium-enterprises 
in their early stages of operations do place a strong emphasis on sales growth, but not necessarily on 
profitability. Similarly, firms may sometimes strategically choose to emphasize cost 
savings/efficiencies or cash-flow improvements ahead of profitability. In such circumstances, an 
analytical focus on corporate profitability (e.g. return on assets) alone may understate the true 
performance achieved by these firms as well as distort the relationship between internationalization 
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and performance. The use of a range of performance measures in the current article should help 
increase the likelihood of capturing the value impact of foreign acquisitions for firms that may have a 
broad objective function.  
$QRWKHULPSRUWDQWFRQWULEXWLRQRIWKLVSDSHULVWRWHVWZKHWKHUDQDFTXLULQJILUP¶VSULRUH[SRVXUH
to foreign markets (or its stage of internationalization) enhances or impedes the benefits it reaps from 
increasing levels of internationalization. In this regard, the paper first distinguishes between the cross-
border effect for domestic corporations (i.e. firms with no prior exposure to foreign markets and may 
thus be entering foreign markets for the first time) on the one hand and multinational corporations (i.e. 
firms with prior exposure to foreign markets and perhaps want to increase their foreign presence) on 
the other hand. Further analysis then focuses on existing multinationals and considers how the foreign 
acquisition effect may vary for: (1) multinationals with little exposure to foreign markets; (2) 
multinationals with moderate exposure to foreign markets; and (3) multinationals with significant 
exposure to foreign markets. These analyses on prior exposure to foreign markets are motivated by 
the literature on foreign market experience (e.g. Very & Schweiger, 2001; Davidson, 1980; Johanson 
& Vahlne, 1977).  
The issues explored in this article are based on a sample of 9,419 acquisitions by British firms 
during 1988-2014. The next section relies on the extant literature to establish the potential link 
EHWZHHQIRUHLJQDFTXLVLWLRQVDQGFRUSRUDWHSHUIRUPDQFHDVZHOODVWKHPRGHUDWLQJUROHRIILUPV¶SULRU
exposure to foreign markets on the foreign acquisition-performance nexus. Section 3 describes the 
GDWDDQGPHWKRGVHPSOR\HGIRUWKHVWXG\¶VHPSLULFDODQDO\VLV6HFWLRQVDQGSUHVHQWDQGGLVFXVV
the results, and test the robustness of the results to alternative specifications. Finally, Section 6 
concludes the paper.  
 
2. Related literature 
2.1 Why should foreign acquisitions impact corporate performance?  
Mergers and acquisitions of target companies in foreign countries is a frequently used corporate 
VWUDWHJ\ WR REWDLQ DQGRU LQFUHDVH D ILUP¶V OHYHOV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO EXVLQHVV DFWLYLW\ 6KLPL]X et al., 
2004). Its popularity as a mode of engaging in international business over other modes such as 
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greenfield investments stems from the speed with which the acquiring firm can establish a presence in 
a foreign market. As soon as a target firm is identified in the preferred foreign location and the agreed 
price paid, the acquiring firm obtains full control of the existing resources and capabilities of the 
target firm including its local knowledge and business experience. While other foreign market entry 
modeVVXFKDVMRLQWYHQWXUHRUFRRSHUDWLRQPD\DOVRHQMR\WKHVSHHGDGYDQWDJHWKH\RIWHQGRQ¶WJLYH
the firm full control over existing resources in the foreign market. Moreover, the sharing of 
proprietary business information among partners may sometimes be deemed dangerous which may 
reduce the potential benefits to be reaped from the operations. These reasons, among others, make 
foreign acquisitions an advantageous means of entering new markets especially for firms with little or 
no experience of the new foreign market as long as the right target firm is identified.  
6LQFHPDNLQJIRUHLJQDFTXLVLWLRQVRIWHQUHVXOWLQDQLQFUHDVHLQWKHILUP¶VOHYHOVRILQWHUQDWLRQDO
business or diversification, the current article draws from the international business and diversification 
literature to establish a link between making foreign acquisitions and firm performance. There is 
broad agreement in the literature on the existence of some benefits of international diversification 
which can be harnessed to improve corporate financial performance. Relative to purely domestic 
firms, international firms may enjoy greater cost efficiencies primarily due to greater volume of 
business and the ability to exploit economies of scale (Pangarkar, 2008; Hout, Porter, & Rudden, 
1982). For instance, the wider market and greater volume of business of an international firm may 
justify its investments in a state-of-the-art manufacturing plant whereas a purely domestic rival may 
not be able to justify such an investment. In addition, international firms could augment their 
competitiveness in both home and host markets by exploiting the unique resource endowment and 
location-specific advantages that exist in each of their host countries (Kogut & Chang, 1991). 
International firms, for example, could create competitive advantages by siting specific activities in 
particular locations (e.g. labour-intensive activities in low-wage countries) in order to minimize their 
costs.  
Another important benefit enjoyed by international firms is flexibility due to the possibility of 
arbitrage. Differences across countries can be exploited by shifting production volumes/locations in 
response to wage and tax rates. It is also possible for international firms to reduce their taxes by 
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charging appropriate transfer prices to sister entities. For example, the $160 billion merger and 
acquisition deal announced in 2015 between the US pharmaceutical company, Pfizer, and the Irish 
GUXJFRPSDQ\$OOHUJDQZDVVWUXFWXUHGLQDZD\WKDWPDNHVWKHQHZFRPSDQ\¶VSURILWWREHVXEMHFt 
WR,UHODQG¶VFRUSRUDWLRQWD[UDWHRIZKLFKLVPXFKORZHUWKDQ the 35% Pfizer pays in the US. 
7KLVLVH[SHFWHGWRFRQWULEXWHWRWKHGHDO¶VVDYLQJVZKLFKZDVHVWLPDWHGWREHDURXQGELOOLRQLQWKH
first three years.2 Furthermore, international firms can benefit from the diversity of environments in 
which they operate by enjoying tremendous learning opportunities when conducting business in 
international markets (Kostova & Roth, 2002). Such business knowledge could generate competitive 
advantage for international firms and lead to superior performance. Finally, international firms may 
enjoy lower earnings volatility as they are able to receive cash flows from imperfectly correlated 
foreign markets (Reeb, Mansi, & Allee, 2001). This leads to reduced risks/borrowing costs and 
financing advantages (Agyei-Boapeah, 2017). Overall, these arguments suggest that engaging in 
international business or diversifying internationally should result in better corporate performance.  
However, corporate international diversification is not a guaranteed route to success due to the 
increased cost/risks associated with it, which (in turn) could result in net declines in corporate 
financial performance. Burgman (1996) argues that international firms may face foreign exchange 
risks which impose additional costs and complexities in their operations. Also, the transaction costs 
theory (see Pangarkar, 2008; Hitt et al., 1997; Jones & Hill, 1988) suggests that international 
diversification poses difficult challenges to the management of multinational corporations. For 
example, the management of multinationals will have to deal with the loss or distortion of information 
as it passes through several layers of hierarchy. More so, since each host country has a unique 
business environment, management will have to deal with possible diseconomies that could arise from 
the coordination of operations across disparate host countries. It is also possible for international firms 
to have duplication of operations at each new country, and all these challenges/complexities can result 
in increased coordination, communication, and governance costs for international firms. Finally, 
international diversification (especially when it involves the establishment of a physical presence in a 
                                                          
2http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-34900344 
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new and unknown foreign country) is associated with a liability of foreignness (Hymer, 1976) because 
the international firm (particularly new ones) cannot conduct business as effectively as a local firm. 
Being foreign implies that mistakes in various business decisions are more likely. Such mistakes and 
their corrections could again lead international firms to have higher costs and worse performance.  
Collectively, it is theoretically possible for increased levels of international business activity to be 
either positively or negatively related to performance depending on the net effect of the benefits and 
costs of internationalization in a particular sample. Thus, to the extent that foreign acquisitions lead to 
higher levels of international business activity, undertaking foreign acquisitions should impact on the 
ILUP¶VSHUIRUPDQFH positively or negatively. 
 
 2.2 :K\VKRXOGWKHDFTXLULQJILUP¶VSULRUIRUHLJQPDUNHWHxperience matter?  
Since the impact of foreign acquisitions on firm performance is primarily due to the presence of 
competitive advantages and/or disadvantages in foreign business, the current paper argues that there 
should be systematic cross-sectional variations in the performance impact of foreign acquisitions 
among firms at the early stages of internationalization and their counterparts at a more advanced 
stage. This is because the two groups of firms may have different levels of foreign market experience 
and knowledge, and hence, have different abilities in realizing the gains associated with international 
operations as well as dealing with the difficulties/challenges associated with international business 
activities.  
It is widely acknowledged that the benefits of internationalization may not be realized when post-
implementation processes (e.g. acculturation and integration) are not effectively managed (Very & 
Schweiger, 2001). Thus, the ability of firms to manage the post-implementation processes may 
determine whether or not they achieve any competitive advantages associated with undertaking 
IRUHLJQDFTXLVLWLRQV6LQFHDILUP¶VOHYHORIH[SHULHQFHLQIRUHLJQPDUNHWRSHUDWLRQVPD\EHUHODWHGWR
its ability to manage subsequent international business activities, it is likely that firms at a more 
advanced stages of internationalization (i.e. those with more experience in foreign markets) will enjoy 
superior performance relative to those at the early stages (i.e. firms with little or no experience in 
foreign markets). This is because with increasing foreign market experience, firms acquire a general 
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knowledge of doing business in foreign markets which helps them to reduce mistakes as well as make 
more competent decisions in relation to future foreign business expansions (e.g. Davidson, 1980; 
Johanson & Valne, 1977). Specifically, it is possible that experienced firms will use their extensive 
foreign market knowledge acquired over a number of years in a learning-by doing process to develop 
and implement effective mechanisms to mitigate the increased costs associated with 
internationalization (Haleblain & Finkelstein, 1999; Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998).  
A practical case in point is the rapid global expansion by the British retail multinational ± Marks 
& Spencer (M&S) ± in 2007, after learning valuable lessons from its previous unsuccessful overseas 
adventure in the 1980s and 1990s. In announcing his plans to enter the Chinese market in 2008, Marks 
	6SHQFHU¶VFKLHIH[HFXWive stated emphatically that ³«Ze made some mistakes before [in our global 
H[SDQVLRQV@EXW\RXZRXOGQ¶WEHDVXFFHVVIXOEXVLQHVV LI \RXGLGQ¶W´:LWKDQDOUHDG\VLJQLILFDQW
overseas presence (257 stores in 36 countries), Mark & Spencer could draw on its wealth of 
knowledge and experience in overseas operations to give its plan of expanding into China a greater 
likelihood of success.3 In sum, relative to other firms, the experiential knowledge of firms at advanced 
stages of internationalization is likely to lead to higher (lower) benefits (costs) for them when they 
make foreign acquisitions.  
It is also conceivable that firms at the early stages of internationalization (especially new foreign 
market entrants) may rather enjoy higher advantages over those at the advanced stages. This is 
because, besides the liability of foreignness, most of the major costs associated with international 
business activity (e.g. communication costs, governance costs, and coordination costs) are likely to be 
exacerbated at higher levels of international activity (Lu & Beamish, 2004; Jones & Hill, 1988). For 
instance, firms at the advanced stages of the internationalization process tend to have more extensive 
networks of foreign subsidiaries in more and more countries, which, in turn, escalate their governance 
and coordination costs, and ultimately lead to lower performance. Moreover, some scholars argue that 
firms first expand to countries that are relatively close (in psychic distance) to the home country 
before later moving into more distant and risky countries (e.g. Krapl, 2015; Johanson & Vahlne, 
                                                          
3The Independent newspaper on 7th November 2007. See http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-
features/british-retailers-going-global-744882.html  
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2009). The implication is that the international activities of early-stage firms (particularly new 
entrants) are likely to be less risky, less complicated, and less costly, whereas those of advanced 
staged firms are likely to be more risky and costly. In fact, there is empirical evidence to show that the 
risk-increasing effect of international diversification is stronger for firms that are in more advanced 
stages of the internationalisation process (see Krapl, 2015). Thus, it is plausible for there to be worse 
performance for advanced-stage firms relative to early-stage firms in the internationalization process.  
Collectively, the moderating role of a ILUP¶V VWDJH RI LQWHUQDWLRQDOL]ation on the performance 
impact of foreign acquisitions is an empirical matter to be resolved by empirical research. Hence, this 
paper relies on a large sample of foreign acquisitions made by domestic and multinational British 
firms to empirically test this matter. 
 
3. Methodology   
3.1 Estimation method  
The primary objective of this paper is to examine whHWKHUDILUP¶VGHFLVLRQWRLQFUHDVHLWVOHYHORI
international diversification (i.e. via foreign acquisitions) in year t has a significant impact on its 
financial performance in year t+1.4 To empirically undertake this analysis, one must determine 
whether the observed post-acquisition performances for foreign acquirers are significantly higher or 
lower than what they would have been if these firms had not engaged in foreign acquisitions to 
increase their levels of international diversification. However, the latter outcome is unobservable. A 
possible analysis would be to compare the performances of foreign acquirers with those of non-
acquiring firms. The problem with this form of analysis is that firms select themselves into the 
different groups (acquirers vs. non-acquirers) based on characteristics that might also influence the 
observed outcome. Within the context of this paper, it may be the case that firms with better 
performance are more likely to engage in acquisitions. Thus, results based on a comparison between 
acquirers and non-acquirers are likely to suffer from selection bias.  
                                                          
4When the performance window is extended to cover years t+2 and tWKHVWXG\¶VNH\ILQGLQJVODUJHO\UHPDLQTXDOLWDWLYHO\
unchanged. However, these approaches reduce our sample substantially.  
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In order to minimize this potential selection bias, the current article follows recent studies such as 
Agyei-Boapeah (2015) and Bertrand & Capron (2015) to select a control sample of acquirers rather 
than non-acquirers. Since the primary focus is to investigate the impact of increasing 
internationalisation (via foreign acquisitions) on the performance of foreign acquirers, domestic 
acquirers are relied upon to serve as a control group. Specifically, the sample of firms that engaged in 
domestic acquisitions during the sample period (1988-2014) served as the control sample for the firms 
that engaged in foreign acquisitions (i.e. the main sample). It is important to note that since the 
empirical (multivariate) model utilised in the current paper directly controls for firm size and industry, 
the control firms are not matched by size and/or industry.5  
The goal for using domestic acquirers as a control group is to construct a control group of firms 
that are also active in the market for corporate control, except that their acquisition activities did not 
UHVXOWLQLQFUHDVHVLQWKHLUOHYHOVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOGLYHUVLILFDWLRQ6LQFHILUP¶VIRUHLJQRSHUDWLRQVPD\
increase when they undertake foreign acquisitions but are likely to remain unchanged in domestic 
acquisitions,6 the post-acquisition performance of domestic acquirers could provide a reasonable 
proxy for the expected post-acquisition performance of foreign acquirers had their acquisition 
decisions not increased their foreign operations. Therefore, the results on the foreign acquisition effect 
RQ ILUPSHUIRUPDQFHFRXOGEH LQWHUSUHWHG LQUHODWLRQV WR ILUPV¶DFWLRQV DFTXLVLWLRQVZKLFKGLGQRW
increase their foreign operations.7 
The sample of foreign acquirers and the control sample of domestic acquirers are then used to 
implement the difference-in-differences (DID) estimator in a multivariate regression framework. This 
approach basically compares the difference in the performance of foreign acquirers with that of 
                                                          
5The size and industry differences between the main sample (cross-border acquirers) and the control sample (domestic 
acquirers) and their effect on the performance of the firms can be dealt with by either: (a) constructing a size-and-industry-
matched control sample; or (b) directly controlling for firms size and industry in a multivariate framework. The present 
paper chose the latter approach because it has two main advantages: (1) it helps to directly observe/quantify the size and 
industry effect on firm performance; and (2) it increases the explanatory power of the regression model. 
6,QXQWDEXODWHGUHVXOWVWKLVSDSHUILQGVWKDWILUPV¶OHYHOVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOGLYHUVLILFDWLRQDVPHDVXUHGE\WKHLUIRUHLJQDVsets 
ratio) significantly increase by about 6 percentage points following cross-border acquisitions. However, there is no 
statistically significant change in the levels of international diversification when firms undertake domestic acquisitions.  
7Where a firm undertakes both foreign and domestic acquisitions in the sample period, that firm appears twice ± once in the 
treatment (foreign M&A) sample and also in the control (domestic M&A) sample. In robustness testing, such firms making 
both domestic and foreign acquisitions in the sample period are dropped and the analysis re-done, but the results and main 
conclusions do not change qualitatively. Again, the results are robust to the inclusion of transaction value to control for the 
differences in the size of foreign and domestic acquisitions. These results are untabulated for the sake of brevity, but are 
available upon request.    
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GRPHVWLFDFTXLUHUVZKLOHFRQWUROOLQJIRUWKHRWKHUGHWHUPLQDQWVRIILUPV¶SHUIRUPDQFHHJILUPVL]H
financial leverage, etc.). Specifically, the DID estimation model below, Eq. (1), is the baseline model 
used for the empirical analyses. The parameters of the model are estimated using the random-effects 
generalised least squares (GLS) panel estimation procedure.  
ititittiit XPostFAPostFAePerformanc HEEEEE  54321 )*(    Eq. (1)  
In Eq. (1) above, 1E is the intercept, FA is the foreign acquisition dummy which is equal to one if 
the observed firm is a foreign acquirer, and zero for the control group of firms (domestic acquirers). 
The FA dummy ( 2E  LV H[SHFWHG WR FDSWXUH WKH JHQHUDO GLIIHUHQFHV LQ ILUPV¶ performance which 
emanate from the inherent differences between foreign acquirers and the control firms. It may be the 
case that there is a systematic difference in the performances of firms that undertake foreign 
acquisitions and the control group of firms. Thus, 2E should capture the impact of such differences in 
the two sample groups on performance.  
Post, in Eq. (1) above, is the post-acquisition dummy which is equal to one (zero) if the 
observation is for the year t+1 (year t-1). This variable (and its parameter estimate, 3E ) should capture 
the general changes in corporate performance over the pre-and post-acquisition periods (i.e. from t-1 
to t7KHLQFOXVLRQRIWKLVYDULDEOHUHIOHFWVWKHIDFWWKDWILUPV¶SHUformance may change for most 
firms (whether or not they engaged in foreign acquisitions) during some periods due to general 
economic conditions (e.g. low interest rates, economic growth, etc.). Indeed, acquisitions may be 
more likely in periods of credit availability and high stock market performance which make it easier 
for firms to obtain funding for their investments. So, it is possible for firms, in general, to experience 
changes in their profitability during periods of high acquisition activity. Therefore, the inclusion of 
3E in Eq. (1) helps to control for the macro-economic conditions (e.g. booming stock markets) that 
could induce changes in corporate performance over the pre- and post-acquisition periods (i.e. t-1 and 
t+1).  
The main parameter of interest for the current article is 4E  (i.e. the coefficient for the interaction 
dummy between FA and Post VLQFH LW UHSUHVHQWV WKH DYHUDJH IRUHLJQ DFTXLVLWLRQ LPSDFW RQ ILUPV¶
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financial performance. It ( 4E ) shows the change in corporate performance which is solely due to the 
completion of a foreign acquisition. It is, therefore, hoped that 4E reflects the impacW RQ D ILUP¶V
performance following a corporate activity which increases its levels of international diversification. 
Consequently, a negative (positive) and significant coefficient estimate of 4E would be consistent 
with the view that increasing levels of international diversification (via foreign acquisitions) is 
DVVRFLDWHGZLWKUHGXFHGLPSURYHGDFTXLUHUV¶SHUIRUPDQFH 
It must be noted that in testing the foreign acquisition effect for domestic and multinational firms, 
Eq. (1) is slightly modified by interacting 4E with dummies for the different types of acquirers that 
are of interest to this study (e.g. first time entrants into foreign markets, and acquirers with prior 
exposure to foreign markets). Therefore, the empirical analyses contained in this paper are conducted 
using several related models. The first model is the baseline model in Eq. (1) above, while the 
remaining models are variants of the baseline regression model. 
 
3.2 Measures of the dependent (performance) variable  
Grant et al. (1988) note that findings about the relationship between diversity and performance 
appear to be susceptible to choice of performance measures. Aware of this critique, this paper deploys 
a broad range of performance measures in an attempt to increase the likelihood of representing the 
complex set of goals that firms may have at different points in time (e.g. improve profitability or cash 
flow, cut cost, etc.). Specifically, this article utilises four different but related measures of financial 
performance (return on asset7RELQ¶V4RSHUDWLQJFDVKIORZDQGRSHUDWLQJFRVWWRDVVHVVWKHILUP¶V
performance impact of increasing levels of internationalization. Whether or not these four measures 
are correct proxies of firm performance is a subject of continuing debate in the literature. Each 
performance measure has its own strengths and limitations.  
The first performance measure is the return on asset (ROA). As an accounting-based measure of 
performance, the return on asset is criticised for conveying little informatiRQ DERXW WKH ILUP¶V
economic rate of return and for being subject to management discretion and manipulation. 
Nonetheless, ROA remains a popular performance measure in the literature as well as a useful 
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measure of performance for corporate managers since it serves as the basis for major corporate 
decisions such as executive compensation and undertaking new investment projects. Following the 
extant literature, the current paper measures ROA as the ratio of net income (i.e. pre-tax profit minus 
corporate tax) to the book value of total assets.  
$QRWKHUSRSXODUPHDVXUHRIILUPSHUIRUPDQFHLVWKH7RELQ¶V4ZKLFKLVJHQHUDOO\GHILQHGDVWKH
ratio of the market value of the firm to the replacement cost of its assets. As a market-based measure, 
it is often seen by researchers as providing more relevant (economic) performance information to 
LQYHVWRUV&ULWLTXHV DUJXH WKDW7RELQ¶V4 LV DEHWWHUSUR[\ IRU D ILUP¶VJURZWKRSSRUWXQLW\ WKDQ LWV
performance. Other market-based measures, such as abnormal stock return, have been suggested in 
the literature. However, abnormal stock return, as a proxy for firm performance, is most appropriate 
for all-equity firms. Moreover, there are econometric challenges and debates over the estimation of 
the market model used in abnormal stock return research. As in Agyei-Boapeah et al. (2018), this 
SDSHUGHILQHV7RELQ¶V4DVWRWDODVVHWVPLQXVERRNHTXLW\SOXVPDUNHWHTXLW\GLYLGHGE\WRWDODVVHWV 
The third performance measure utilised in this study is the operating cash flow (OCF) which is an 
important source of information for creditors. The operating cash flow measure is similar to the ROA. 
However, to the extent that corporate managers use their discretion and superior information to 
opportunistically manipulate accounting profit, ROA could become a less reliable measure of firm 
performance and cash flow measures could thus become more preferable. The operating cash flow 
measure of performance is not without criticism. Over finite internals, reporting realized cash flows is 
not necessarily informative because realized cash flows have timing and matching problems that 
FDXVHWKHPWREHD³QRLV\´SHUIRUPDQFHPeasure. The operating cash flow measure is defined in this 
paper as the sum of earnings before interest and tax, depreciation and amortisation expenses, and 
research and development (R&D) expenses divided by total assets.  
The final performance measure is the operating cost (OC) measure. This is not very common in 
the empirical literature, perhaps, because other performance measures (e.g. ROA) are functions of the 
operating cost performance measure. However, its inclusion in this study as a performance measure is 
motivated by the emphasis on costs in internationalization theory. As noted earlier in Section 2, the 
impact of foreign acquisition on firm performance is mostly through its effect (increase or decrease) 
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on the cost structure of the firm. Thus, the operating cost variable helps to directly observe the foreign 
DFTXLVLWLRQLPSDFWRQWKHILUP¶VRSHUDWLQJFRVW7RWKHEHVWRIP\NQRZOHdge, this is the first study to 
directly consider this issue. Operating cost is defined as gross profit minus operating profit divided by 
total assets. 
 
3.3 The control variables  
In order to reduce the residual variance of Eq. (1) and its related models, a vector of control 
variables (X) is included in all the regression models used for the analyses. The choice of these 
variables was guided by intuition and the literature on firm performance and internationalization (e.g. 
Mehran, 1995; Lu & Beamish, 2001; Lu & Beamish, 2004; Pangarkar, 2008). First, the number of 
\HDUV IRUZKLFKDILUPKDVEHHQ OLVWHGRQ'DWDVWUHDPLV LQFOXGHG WRSUR[\IRU WKHILUP¶VDJHDQG WR
control for the general business experience of the firm since older firms may be more experienced, 
and hence, have superior performance. It is also plausible for older firms to have inferior performance 
since their products are likely to be at the declining stage of the product life cycle. Second, sales per 
employee is included to control for the employee productive capacity of the firm since firms with 
higher employee productivity are likely to perform better.  
Third, the effect of firm size is controlled for using the natural log of sales as a proxy. Larger 
firms can enjoy more scale economies as well as have greater resource pool (Agyei-Boapeah et al., 
2018), which could result in better performance. Fourth, the ratio of total debt to total assets is 
included to control for financial leverage since the use of debt by firms is associated with both 
advantages (e.g. tax savings) and disadvantages (e.g. cost of financial distress) which ultimately affect 
firm performance. Fifth, asset tangibility is included to control for the real capital intensity of the firm 
since real assets largely represent the physical productive capacity of a firm. This is measured as the 
UDWLR RI QHW SURSHUW\ SODQW DQG HTXLSPHQW VFDOHG E\ WRWDO DVVHWV 6L[WK WKH ILUP¶V WHFKQRORJLFDO
capabilities is controlled for by including the ratio of research and development (R&D) expenses to 
total assets. Seventh, since a number of firms had missing R&D values, a dummy variable is also 
included to control for such firms.  
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Eighth, a dummy for multi-product segment firm is included to control for product diversification. 
Product diversified firms may enjoy better performance because they face lower cash flow volatility 
(Agyei-Boapeah, 2017). However, they can also suffer inferior performance if they face higher 
agency costs. Ninth, the effect of monetary influences is controlled for by including the US dollar-
sterling exchange rate. The dollar is used because it is frequently used as a reference point for 
exchange rates. Apart from controlling for the monetary influences of international business on firm 
profitability, the US dollar-sterling exchange rate also controls for general macroeconomic conditions 
prevailing across the sample period.8 In addition, industry dummies are included to control for 
industry fixed effects. Finally, the regression model contains an error term, itH . 
 
3.4 Data and descriptive statistics 
In terms of the data for the analysis, all completed acquisitions (including foreign and domestic 
deals) from 1985-2015 by non-financial publicly listed UK acquiring firms were collected.9 The data 
on the dates of acquisition and the target nations are obtained from 7KRPVRQ2QH%DQNHU¶V0HUJHU
and Acquisitions database. It was decided to only keep deals for which the acquirer is not a 
governmental agency or a healthcare organisation since such organisations are generally not profit-
oriented. Moreover, the relevant annual accounting data10 for acquiring firms had to be available in 
Datastream for two years (the years immediately before and after the focal acquisition). Applying 
these criteria resulted in a sample to 9,419 deals made by 1,443 UK firms during 1988-2014. The final 
dataset utilised in the empirical analyses is obtained by constructing a 2-period panel dataset for the 
9,419 acquiring firms. For each acquiring firm in year t, 2-years of observations are required in order 
to undertake the empirical analyses (i.e. t-1 and t+1). Thus, observing these 9,419 acquiring firms 
over a 2-year period produces observation units of 18,838 firm-years (i.e. 9,419 firms x 2 years = 
18,838) which are used in the empirical analyses. 
                                                          
8In untabulated results, the US dollar-sterling exchange rate variable is dropped and the effect of macroeconomic influences 
is captured by the inclusion of year dummies for each year in the sample period (1988-2014, except 1988 which was used as 
a reference year). The results based on this specification are qualitatively similar to our reported results. 
9Consistent with the tradition in corporate finance research, financial firms (e.g. banks, insurance companies, etc.) are 
excluded from the study because they have special asset compositions and are also subject to stricter government regulations 
which make them different from other firms. 
10That is, the data to calculate firm performance and the control variables (e.g. fLUPVL]H52$7RELQ¶V4HWFXVHGLQWKH
regression model should be available. 
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Table 1 presents the breakdown of acquisitions by year, type, (foreign vs. domestic M&A), and 
the prior foreign exposure of the acquirer (multinational vs. domestic firm). A foreign acquisition is 
defined to include deals in which the target country is different from the UK. Out of the 9,419 deals, 
3,729 (40%) are foreign and 5,690 (60%) are domestic. However, during the latter years (i.e. 2001-
2014), the gap between the number of foreign and domestic deals has narrowed (2,089 vs. 2,634) 
which reflects the rising trend in foreign acquisitions over recent years. This rising trend in foreign 
acquisitions is also revealed by changes in the proportion of cross-border acquisitions to total 
acquisitions over the years (see Table 1).  
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
When the deals are differentiated by the type of acquirer, 61% and 39% of the deals are made by 
multinationals and domestic firms, respectively. It is interesting to note that during the latter years (i.e. 
2001-2014), whilst the proportion of domestic firms shrunk, that of multinationals surged (33% vs. 
67%), suggesting that more and more businesses are becoming international in recent years. Firms are 
classified as multinationals (i.e. those firms with prior exposure to foreign markets) if they have 
reported non-UK assets or sales on Datastream, and as domestic firms (i.e. firms without prior foreign 
market exposure) if they have no foreign assets or sales. In terms of the time period, over 93% of the 
deals were completed between 1991 and 2014, implying that the results are more likely to reflect 
recent deals.  
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
7DEOH  UHSRUWV WKH GHVFULSWLYH VWDWLVWLFV DQG FRUUHODWLRQ PDWUL[ IRU WKH VWXG\¶V YDULDEOHV 7KH
statistics are based on data observations from the pre-acquisition years. According to the data, the 
average sample (acquiring) firm is profitable; with a retuUQRQDVVHWRID7RELQ¶V4RIDQG
an operating cash flow ratio of 12% of assets. These statistics are in line with studies that find 
DFTXLULQJILUPVWREHJHQHUDOO\SURILWDEOHDQGVHHPWRFRQILUPVRPHSUDFWLWLRQHUV¶YLHZWKDWJURZWK
by mergers and acquisitions are a natural progression following remarking performance by firms (e.g. 
Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; Hodgkinson and Partington, 2008; Agyei-Boapeah, 2017). Thus, 
the acquiring firms in our sample may well represent well-performing firms whose managers may be 
very confident in their abilities.  
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Table 2 also shows a strong positive correlation between the key performance variables (i.e. 
UHWXUQRQDVVHWV7RELQ¶V4DQGRSHUDWLQJFDVKIORZUDWLR7KHFRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQUHWXUQRQDVVHWV
(ROA) and operating cash flow ratio (the accounting-based performance measures) is as high as 0.91, 
whilst the correlation between the accounting-based performance measures and the market-based 
SHUIRUPDQFH PHDVXUH 7RELQ¶V 4 LV DURXQG  7KHVH FRUUHODWLRn statistics are significant at 1% 
level and the high correlation between the accounting-based and market-based performance measures 
is consistent with the literature (Mehran, 1995). Finally, the descriptive statistics suggest that the 
correlation between the key performance measures and the control variables are largely consistent 
with expectations. For example, the return on assets and the operating cash flow ratio (and sometimes 
WKH 7RELQ¶V 4 DUH SRVLWLYHO\ FRUUHODWHG ZLWK ILUP DJH ILUP VL]H FDSLWDO Lntensity, and R&D 
expenditure; but negatively correlated with financial leverage. Again, these relationships are in line 
with the extant literature (see e.g. Lu & Beamish, 2004). 
 
4. Results and discussions 
4.1 The foreign acquisition effect on financial performance  
Table 3 presents the multivariate regression results. The reported results are based on 12 different 
models. The dependent variable for Models 1, 5, and 9 is return on asset (ROA), and the dependent 
YDULDEOH IRU 0RGHOV   DQG  LV 7RELQ¶V 4 2SHUDWLQJ FDVK IORZ UDWLR 2&) LV WKH GHSHQGHQW
variable for Models 3, 7, and 11, and operating cost ratio (OC) is the dependent variable for Models 4, 
8, and 12.  
Models 1-4 present results for the test of foreign acquisition effect on performance. The results 
across the four performance measures indicate that foreign acquisitions, on average, result in 
significDQW GHFOLQHV LQ WKH DFTXLUHUV¶ SHUIRUPDQFH 6SHFLILFDOO\ WKH FRPSOHWLRQ RI D IRUHLJQ
acquisition by a firm is associated with reductions of about 0.7% in ROA and operating cash flow, a 
 GLS LQ LWV 7RELQ¶V 4 DQG D  ULVH LQ RSHUDWLQJ FRVW $OO WKHVH performance changes are 
statistically significant at conventional levels. Thus, the evidence seems to favour the view that the 
costs of internationalization are generally greater than the benefits for most firms at least in the short-
term (Lu & Beamish, 2004; Burgman, 1996). Since mergers and acquisitions are generally long-term 
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projects, in untabulated results, the tests are repeated for performance measures covering the three 
years post-acquisition, and the results remain qualitatively similar. Mindful of the challenge of 
inferring merger-related performance changes from performance measures that are further away from 
the merger eventWKLVSDSHUGLGQ¶WFRQVLGHUSHUIRUPDQFHFKDQJHVEH\RQGWKUHH\HDUVpost-acquisition.  
These measurement challenges notwithstanding, the finding of poor performance following 
foreign acquisitions, and possibly global expansions in general by UK firms is in line with real 
corporate stories of unsuccessful global expansions by UK firms including Marks & Spencer, HMV, 
Next, among others. For instance, in the early 1990s, Next moved into the US market opening a 
couple of stores including one in Boston. It lost some millions of pounds on the venture before 
retreating. Similarly, following a series of losses, HMV closed its three remaining US stores in 2004, 
drawing a line under its loss-making American adventure.  
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
An important question arising from this finding of significant performance deterioration following 
foreign acquisitions is whether some types of firms are better able to squeeze more benefits from 
foreign acquisitions than others; or to put it differently, whether some types of firms are better able to 
utilise their prior foreign market experience to reduce the costs associated with internationalization. 
These issues are the focus of the next set of analyses. 
 
4.2 7KHPRGHUDWLQJHIIHFWRIDFTXLUHUV¶VWDJHRILnternationalization  
There may be an asymmetric foreign acquisition impact on the performance of firms that enter 
foreign markets for the first time (domestic firms) and those firms that have prior presence in foreign 
markets (multinationals). The results of this test are reported in Models 5-12 of Table 3. In conducting 
these analyses, two separate dummies for domestic firms and multinationals are created and interacted 
with the average cross-border effect ( 4E ) in the baseline model. Specifically, 4E in Models 5-8 is 
interacted with a dummy for domestic firms whilst 4E in Models 9-12 is interacted with a dummy 
variable for multinationals. Thus, these results show how the average negative cross-border 
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performance effect differs between domestic firms (i.e. first time entrants into foreign markets) and 
multinationals (i.e. existing foreign market participants increasing their foreign operations).  
The results indicate that the decline in corporate performance following foreign acquisitions is 
restricted to multinationals. In Models 5-8, foreign acquisitions do not seem to significantly reduce 
the performance (as measured by ROA7RELQ¶V4DQGRSHUDWLQJFRVWVRIGRPHVWLF ILUPV5DWKHU
these foreign deals seem to offer domestic corporations the opportunity to significantly boost their 
operating cash flows by about 2.3%. Thus, domestic corporations seem to make some gains from 
foreign acquisitions. Meanwhile, Models 9-12 tell a completely different story about multinational. 
The performance measures across all four proxies exhibit a statistically significant decline following 
foreign acquisitions by existing multinationals. Whiles the ROA7RELQ¶V4DQG WKHRSHUDWLQJFDVK
flow of multinationals significantly declined, their operating cost significantly increased subsequent to 
the completion of foreign acquisitions. These findings generally appear to be inconsistent with the 
experiential learning literature which suggests that firms with prior experience in foreign markets 
should enjoy better performance.  
At least two main reasons could explain these results. First, it is possible that domestic firms 
undertaking foreign acquisitions (i.e. first time entrants into foreign markets) may not be completely 
unknowledgeable about international business operations but could have gained some valuable 
foreign business experience through exporting. This is because firms often develop their international 
operations in small steps, rather than making large foreign acquisitions at single points in time. 
Johanson & Valne (1977) show that firms typically start exporting to a country before they later 
establish a physical foreign presence in the host country. Therefore, the experiential learning 
advantage touted to be enjoyed by existing multinationals in a market over new entrants may be 
trivial. Second, it could be the case that the finding of negative foreign acquisition impact on the 
performance of multinationals is unduly driven by multinationals with very little experience in foreign 
markets. Some multinationals may have more foreign market experience than others, thus, a better test 
of the experiential learning hypothesis needs to distinguish between international firms with low or 
high levels of foreign exposure.  
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This conjecture is tested by dividing the sample of multinational firms into terciles based on their 
foreign asset ratios and creating three separate dummies to represent each subsample. The present 
paper relies on the foreign asset ratios (FAR) to proxy for the extent of international business 
experience of multinationals. The first group of multinationals have low foreign asset ratios and are 
deemed to be at the early stages of their internationalization process, thus, they are expected to have 
very little experience in foreign market operations. The second group of multinationals have moderate 
foreign asset ratios while the final subsample has high foreign asset ratios. It is hoped that the second 
and final subsamples would represent those multinationals at mature stages of their 
internationalization strategies, and therefore have substantial experience in foreign market operations.  
The three dummies are interacted with the key parameter of interest ( 4E ) in an attempt to 
estimate the differential impact of foreign acquisitions on the performance of multinationals at 
different stages of the internationalization process. The results, reported in Table 4, show that the 
earlier finding of reduced performance of multinationals following foreign acquisitions was hugely 
influenced by the activities of multinationals at the early stage of their internationalization evolution 
(i.e. inexperienced multinationals). Specifically, when early-stage multinationals made foreign 
acquisitions, they experienced significantly poorer financial performance across all the performance 
proxies (see Models 1-4 of Table 4). Interestingly, it seems the ex-ante performance of early-stage 
multinationals is better than those of advanced-stage multinationals (see parameter estimates for the 
dummies for low, moderate, and high exposure firms in Table 4). Perhaps, earlier successes enjoyed 
in their first (or previous) international operations make these firms complacent and thus overestimate 
their ability (experience) to the extent that they undertake more risky foreign operations.  
On the contrary, in Models 5-8, there is no statistically significant change in most of the 
SHUIRUPDQFHSUR[LHV7RELQ¶V4RSHUDWLQJFDVKIORZDQGRSHUDWLQJFRVWVZKHQIRUHLJQDFTXLVLWLRQV
are undertaken by multinational firms with moderate exposure to foreign markets. In fact, these firms 
seem to report significant performance improvements in terms of ROA. These results imply that the 
foreign market experiential learning advantage becomes more beneficial when a firm is at a matured 
stage of its internationalization process. These multinationals at the intermediate stage of 
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internationalization perhaps learn from their earlier mistakes (when they were at the early stage) to 
improve upon their future international expansion decisions.  
Finally, the results in Models 9-12 of Table 4 suggest that firms at a more advanced stage of their 
internationalization evolution tend to lose hold of their operational costs which then adversely affect 
their operating cash flows. They however manage (perhaps due to their substantial foreign market 
experience) to avoid significant declines in their bottom-line performance measures such as ROA and 
7RELQ¶V47KHULVHIDOOLQWKHRSHUDWLRQDOFRVWFDVKIORZRIDGYDQFHG-stage multinationals may be 
due to the increased coordination, communication, and governance costs associated with running a 
large, complex multinational organisation.  
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
 
4.4 Control variables  
Until now, the discussion has only focused on 4E in the model. This section turns attention to the 
discussion of the other explanatory variables in the regressions. To conserve space, this discussion is 
mainly concentrated on the models that are based on the entire sample (i.e. Models 1-4 of Table 3), 
but key variables in other models are also highlighted. First, it seems that, besides the foreign 
acquisition event (i.e. increasing levels of international diversification), those firms that engaged in 
foreign acquisitions generally had better ex-ante performance relative to their counterparts that 
engaged in domestic acquisitions. This is because, as depicted in Tables 3 and 4, the parameters for 
the foreign deal dummies ( 2E ) are mostly positive and sometimes significant. This provides further 
support for the conclusion that managerial overconfidence may be driving the foreign acquisitions in 
WKHFXUUHQWDUWLFOH¶VVDPSOHDQGWKHUHVXOWLQJSRRUpost-acquisition performance observed.  
Second, 3E  (i.e. the parameter estimate for post-acquisition period) is mostly negative and 
significant. This suggests that acquisitions generally occur in periods of high competition (low 
profitability) in the macro-economy that leads firms to restructure/consolidate in order to stay 
competitive. Also, most of the other control variables have the predicted effect on firm performance 
(especially in the ROA, operating cash flow, and operating cost) and are also in line with most of the 
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findings in prior studies. For example, firm size, employee productivity, capital intensity, and 
exchange rates have positive (negative) effect on ROA DQG RSHUDWLQJ FDVK IORZ 7RELQ¶V 4 DQG
operating costs). However, financial leverage and R&D expenditure are negatively (positively) related 
to firm performance as measured by ROA DQGRSHUDWLQJFDVKIORZ7RELQ¶V4DQGRSHUDWLQJFRVWV 
Further, firms that are diversified across several products and industries seem to be associated with 
lower performance.  
Finally, to reflect the fact a firm may undertake several acquisitions in the sample period, the 
standard errors in all reported Models in Tables 3-5 are allowed to cluster by firm. When more 
conservative, time-clustered, standard errors are utilised to reflect the fact that M&A transactions may 
also cluster over time (Harford, 2005), the key conclusions of the paper remain qualitatively 
unchanged.   
 
5. Robustness testing and further analysis 
This section conducts a number of analyses to test the robustness of our findings to alternative 
specifications. To conserve space, results are only reported for models with ROA as the dependent 
variable. First, our earlier analysis on the mediating role of prior foreign market exposure is based on 
a subsample analysis that relies on terciles of the foreign asset ratio. While this approach helps to 
examine the foreign acquisition-performance link within a specific subsample (e.g. those with low 
prior foreign market exposure), it is limited in revealing the relationships among the different 
subsamples. Therefore, an alternative approach based on an interaction terms of 4E  with quadratic 
and cubic transformations of the foreign asset ratio (i.e. FAR_2 and FAR_3) is utilised. As can be 
seen from Models 1-3 of Table 5, the interaction term ( 4E ) is negative and significant only in Model 
1 (the untransformed FAR). In Models 2-3, the interaction terms involving the transformed foreign 
asset ratios (representing higher levels of internationalization) are insignificant, suggesting that higher 
levels of internationalization are not associated with poor foreign acquisition performance.  
Similarly, in Model 4, when all the interaction terms are included in a single regression, the 
negative foreign acquisition effect on performance is strongest (-0.021) for the interaction term 
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involving the untransformed FAR (low levels of internationalization), though not significant at 
conventional levels. These results are generally in line with WKHFXUUHQWDUWLFOH¶V general conclusion 
that the negative foreign acquisition performance may be driven by those multinational firms with low 
levels of internationalization. 
Second, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) and Hong, Kaplan, and Mandelker (1978) suggest that 
the accounting method (pooling vs. purchase) used for the business combination may influence the 
acquisition performance. This is tested by taking advantage of the abolishing of the pooling of interest 
method in 2004 by IFRS 3, and restricting the accounting method for business combination to the 
purchase method. Therefore, the effect of the purchased accounting method is captured in 4E by 
interacting the variable of interest with a dummy for post-2003 era (i.e. the period of compulsory 
application of the purchased method). The results, in Model 5, indicate that foreign acquisitions 
completed in the periods of exclusive application of the purchase accounting method did not 
significantly experience any superior or worse performance, compared with those completed when the 
pooling accounting method was allowed. This suggests that the distinction between pooling and 
purchased method of accounting for business combination is unlikely to significantly affect returns in 
foreign acquisitions. 
Finally, the issue of wKHWKHUD³PHUJHURIHTXDOV´LPSDFWVDFTXLVLWLRQSHUIRUPDQFHGLIIHUHQWO\LV
considered. %\XVLQJ WKHDPRXQWSDLG IRU WKH WDUJHWDV DSUR[\ IRU WKH VL]HRI WDUJHWD ³PHUJHURI
HTXDOV´ is defined to include those deals in which the size of the target firm is at least 40% the size of 
the acquirer. Varying the 40% threshold did not significantly change the results. As shown in Model 
 WKH IRUHLJQ DFTXLVLWLRQ HIIHFW RQ SHUIRUPDQFH GRHV QRW VLJQLILFDQWO\ GLIIHU EHWZHHQ ³PHUJHUV RI
HTXDOV´DQGRWKHUW\SHVRIPHUJers.            
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
 
6. Conclusion and managerial implications  
This paper utilises a mergers and acquisitions dataset to provide new empirical insights into the 
link between international corporate activity and firm performance. It relies on the international 
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business and strategy literature to hypothesize and test how the decision by a firm to increase its 
international operations (via foreign acquisitions) may impact its financial performance. The findings 
indicate that relative to domestic acquisitions, foreign acquisitions (on average) result in declines in 
acquiriQJ ILUPV¶ ILQDQFLDOSHUIRUPDQFH (as measured by ROA7RELQ¶V4RSHUDWLQJFDVK IORZDQG
operating costs). However, the negative and significant foreign acquisition impact on corporate 
financial performance is primarily associated with existing multinational corporations at the early 
stages of their internationalization evolution (i.e. inexperienced multinationals). Interestingly, foreign 
acquisitions undertaken by domestic firms (new entrants into foreign markets) and by multinationals 
at mature stages of internationalization (i.e. more experienced MNCs) do not experience significant 
declines in their performance.  
The results presented in this paper have several important implications on both corporate theory 
and practice. First, the decline in the financial performance of foreign acquirers suggests that 
international diversification is generally associated with more costs than benefits, at least in the short-
term. Therefore, managers, particularly the overconfident ones, who are contemplating international 
expansion through mergers and acquisitions should be more sceptical about the perceived benefits of 
these foreign deals and be prepared for some declines in their performance at least in the few years 
following the acquisition.  
Second, the findings imply that the increased complexities (risks and costs) associated with 
international corporate activity is not symmetric for all acquiring firms. First time entrants into foreign 
markets (i.e. domestic firms undertaking foreign acquisitions) appear to be able to make smart choices 
in their foreign acquisition decisions, and are thus able to avoid poor financial performance 
subsequent to foreign acquisitions. A possible explanation is that the acquisition of a suitable local 
target firm by a domestic firm substantially ameliorates the absence of the foreign market experience 
on the part of the domestic firm. This is because the acquisition makes it possible for the domestic 
firm to utilise the organisational knowledge and experience of the local target firm. Also, the results 
suggest that the benefits of utilising prior foreign market experience and knowledge of the acquiring 
firm to manage the complexities in new foreign environments can only be realized by multinationals 
at mature stages of the internationalisation process. These results should encourage and embolden 
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managers of domestic firms (and those with no prior foreign market experience) to consider using 
foreign acquisitions as a strategic tool to enter new markets, since the acquisition of a suitable target 
in the foreign country provides an effective mechanism for securing vital local knowledge and 
experience in the new market.  
While we have attempted to control for several factors in the empirical analysis, data 
unavailability has made it impossible to FRQWURO IRU ILUP¶V GLYHVWLWXUHV ZKLFK may be an important 
determinant of M&A success (Gugler et al., 2003). Also, the analysis of this article is based on a UK 
sample and thus generalisations of its conclusions should be done with caution. Future studies can 
extend this study by employing a global sample for its analysis in an attempt to examine the 
applicability of the findings outside the UK. 
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Table 1: Acquisitions by UK firms during 1988-2014 organised by type of acquisitions and type of acquirers 
Years All Type of acquisition Type of firm 
DA FA % of FA DC MNC % of MNC 
1988 16 16 0 0.00 16 0 0.00 
1989 54 48 6 0.11 47 7 0.13 
1990 64 50 14 0.22 58 6 0.09 
1991 117 105 12 0.10 100 17 0.15 
1992 254 183 71 0.28 133 121 0.48 
1993 316 197 119 0.38 139 177 0.56 
1994 442 291 151 0.34 187 255 0.58 
1995 500 323 177 0.35 170 330 0.66 
1996 482 296 186 0.39 163 319 0.66 
1997 578 369 209 0.36 250 328 0.57 
1998 621 425 196 0.32 282 339 0.55 
1999 618 365 253 0.41 259 359 0.58 
2000 634 388 246 0.39 280 354 0.56 
2001 478 265 213 0.45 172 306 0.64 
2002 348 210 138 0.40 120 228 0.66 
2003 313 173 140 0.45 107 206 0.66 
2004 358 223 135 0.38 137 221 0.62 
2005 451 251 200 0.44 169 282 0.63 
2006 468 270 198 0.42 180 288 0.62 
2007 595 322 273 0.46 179 416 0.70 
2008 433 211 222 0.51 90 343 0.79 
2009 224 121 103 0.46 64 160 0.71 
2010 249 138 111 0.45 94 155 0.62 
2011 281 137 144 0.51 73 208 0.74 
2012 240 133 107 0.45 63 177 0.74 
2013 277 173 104 0.38 89 188 0.68 
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2014 8 7 1 0.13 7 1 0.13 
Total 9,419 5,690 3,729 0.40 3,628 5,791 0.61 
This table summarises the sample of completed acquisitions made by publicly listed non-financial firms from the UK during 1988-2014. DA and FA represent 
domestic acquisitions and foreign acquisitions respectively. A foreign (domestic) acquisition is one with a target firm from outside the UK (within the UK). DC 
and MNC represent domestic corporations and multinational corporations, respectively. MNC (DC) have (have no) reported values of foreign assets on 
Datastream.   
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for variables 
No. Variables Mean SD Min. Max. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 ROA 0.04 0.15 -0.96 0.26 
         
  
2 Tobin's Q 1.96 1.50 0.55 10.61 0.515 
        
  
3 Operating cash flow 0.12 0.16 -0.80 0.43 0.907 0.505 
       
  
4 Operating cost  0.30 0.27 0.01 1.81 0.080 0.213 0.174 
      
  
5 Firm age 31.40 14.42 7.00 51.00 0.127 -0.032 0.150 -0.078 
     
  
6 Employee productivity 160.94 236.09 0.00 1638.00 0.002 -0.154 -0.065 -0.056 -0.026 
    
  
7 Firm size 12.10 2.50 0.00 16.82 0.208 0.073 0.246 -0.146 0.361 0.200 
   
  
8 Financial leverage 0.21 0.17 0.00 0.79 -0.151 -0.105 -0.054 -0.193 0.142 0.037 0.205 
  
  
9 Real asset base 0.31 0.25 0.00 0.94 0.060 -0.179 0.155 -0.206 0.263 -0.142 0.071 0.361 
 
  
10 R&D expenditure 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.17 0.072 0.125 0.114 0.109 0.188 0.009 0.227 -0.074 -0.069   
11 Exchange rate 1.66 0.17 1.44 2.00 0.028 0.013 0.004 0.023 -0.098 0.039 0.006 -0.019 -0.105 -0.009 
7KLV WDEOH VXPPDULVHV WKHGHVFULSWLYH VWDWLVWLFV DQG WKH FRUUHODWLRQPDWUL[ IRU WKH VWXG\¶V VDPSOH7KH VWDWLVWLFV DUHEDVHG on data observations of the acquiring firms for the year immediately before (t-1) the effective year of the 
acquisition (t). The correlation statistics in bold are not significant at conventional levels (i.e. 10% and below). 
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Table 3: The average impact of foreign acquisitions on the financial performance of acquiring firms 
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Explanatory variables 
All firms Domestic firms Multinational firms 
ROA Q OCF OC ROA  Q OCF OC ROA  Q OCF OC 
Foreign acq. effect ( 4E ) -0.007** -0.056** -0.007** 0.010*** 0.016 -0.062 0.023** -0.005 -0.010*** -0.045* -0.011*** 0.011*** 
  (0.046) (0.044) (0.032) (0.014) (0.138) (0.477) (0.023) (0.719) (0.003) (0.088) (0.000) (0.006) 
Foreign deal dummy ( 2E ) 0.001 0.228*** 0.005 -0.022*** -0.005* 0.158*** -0.002 -0.017*** 0.000 0.171*** 0.005 -0.022*** 
  (0.811) (0.000) (0.158) (0.000) (0.074) (0.000) (0.483) (0.002) (0.896) (0.000) (0.131) (0.000) 
Post-acquisition dummy ( 3E ) 
-0.014*** -0.209*** -0.017*** 0.000 -0.018*** -0.225*** -0.020*** 0.004* -0.013*** -0.211*** -0.015*** 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.888) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.091) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.894) 
Domestic firm dummy « « « « -0.005 -0.165*** -0.006* -0.003 « « « « 
  « « « « (0.116) (0.000) (0.078) (0.968) « « « « 
Multinational firm dummy « « « « « « « « 0.005 0.175*** 0.005 -0.001 
  « « « « « « « « (0.156) (0.000) (0.142) (0.938) 
Firm age 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001* 0.000 -0.001*** 0.001 -0.001* 0.000 -0.001*** 
  (0.335) (0.115) (0.665) (0.000) (0.366) (0.063) (0.711) (0.000) (0.356) (0.065) (0.693) (0.000) 
Employee productivity 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.002*** -0.004*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.004*** 0.000 -0.001*** 
  (0.003) (0.000) (0.437) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.475) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.485) (0.000) 
Firm size 0.023*** -0.029*** 0.023*** -0.019*** 0.023*** -0.039*** 0.023*** -0.019*** 0.023*** -0.039*** 0.023*** -0.019*** 
  (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Financial leverage -0.193*** 0.477*** -0.136*** 0.086*** -0.193*** 0.479*** -0.136*** 0.086*** -0.192*** 0.480*** -0.136*** 0.086*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Capital intensity 0.105*** -0.252*** 0.141*** -0.092*** 0.105*** -0.231*** 0.142*** -0.093*** 0.105*** -0.232*** 0.142*** -0.092*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D expenditure -0.471*** 0.339*** -0.337*** 0.544*** -0.473*** 0.218*** -0.339*** 0.541*** -0.474*** 0.216*** -0.340*** 0.543*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
Missing R&D dummy 0.008** 0.260*** 0.010*** 0.061*** 0.008*** 0.274*** 0.010*** 0.061*** 0.008*** 0.273*** 0.010*** 0.061*** 
  (0.015) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 
Product diversification -0.009*** -0.135*** -0.011*** -0.006 -0.010*** -0.160*** -0.011*** -0.006 -0.010*** -0.160*** -0.011*** -0.006 
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  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.264) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.264) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.258) 
Exchange rate 0.035*** -0.685*** 0.013* -0.046*** 0.036*** -0.686*** 0.013* -0.046*** 0.036*** -0.685*** 0.013* -0.046*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.082) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.076) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.079) (0.001) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept ( 1E ) -0.330*** 0.140*** -0.242*** 0.574*** -0.324*** 0.341*** -0.235*** 0.574*** -0.330*** 0.169*** -0.242*** 0.575*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Regression statistics   
   
  
   
  
  
  
Number of observations 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 
Number of acquiring firms 9,419 9,419 9,419 9,419 9,419 9,419 9,419 9,419 9,419 9,419 9,419 9,419 
Wald Chi-squared statistic 1,201.72 2,285.52 1,860.30 3,467.25 1,219.56 2,280.71 1,863.46 3,495.59 1,236.06 2,275.42 1,889.24 3,505.82 
    
   
  
   
  
  
  
R-squared: Within 0.085 0.033 0.070 0.049 0.086 0.035 0.071 0.048 0.086 0.035 0.071 0.049 
                     Between 0.221 0.139 0.229 0.222 0.221 0.140 0.229 0.222 0.221 0.140 0.229 0.222 
                     Overall 0.177 0.114 0.184 0.192 0.177 0.115 0.184 0.192 0.177 0.115 0.184 0.192 
7KLVWDEOHSUHVHQWVUHVXOWVIRUWKHDYHUDJHIRUHLJQDFTXLVLWLRQLPSDFWRQDFTXLULQJILUPV¶ILQDQFLDOSHUIRUPDQFH7KHGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHLQ0RGHOVDQGLVUHWXUQRQDVVHW52$0RGHOVDQGLV7RELQ¶V4LQ0RGHOVDQGLVRSHUDting 
cash flow ratio; in Models 4, 8, and 12 is operating cost ratio. The foreign acquisition effect is the interaction between foreign deal dummy and post-acquisition dummy. Classification of the firms into DCs and MNCs is based on geographic segment-level 
data on foreign assets collected from Datastream. MNCs have non-zero pre-acquisition reported values of foreign assets on Datastream. DCs have zero reported foreign asset values in the pre-acquisition period on Datastream. All specifications include 
industry dummies. Year dummies are not included because of the direct inclusion of the Exchange rate variable to control for monetary influences in the macro-economy. Figures in parenthesis are p-values. The standard errors are allowed to cluster by firm. 
***, **, and * denote that the coefficient is statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 4: Analysis of the levels of prior foreign market exposure 
Models         (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Explanatory variables 
Low foreign market exposure firms Moderate foreign market exposure firms High foreign market exposure firms 
ROA  Q OCF OC ROA Q OCF OC ROA Q OCF OC 
Foreign acq. effect ( 4E ) -0.029*** -0.237*** -0.023*** 0.030*** 0.008** -0.019 0.004 -0.002 -0.004 0.046 -0.009** 0.008* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.564) (0.198) (0.706) (0.292) (0.141) (0.016) (0.059) 
Foreign deal dummy ( 2E ) 0.001 0.229*** 0.004 -0.020*** -0.003 0.189*** 0.001 -0.019*** -0.001 0.192*** 0.002 -0.010* 
  (0.682) (0.000) (0.165) (0.000) (0.229) (0.000) (0.807) (0.000) (0.612) (0.000) (0.397) (0.061) 
Post-acquisition dummy ( 3E ) 
-0.015*** -0.212*** -0.018*** 0.001 -0.018*** -0.228*** -0.020*** 0.004* -0.017*** -0.238*** -0.018*** 0.002 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.596) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.097) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.511) 
Low exposure dummy 0.013*** 0.083*** 0.011*** 0.012*** « « « « « « « « 
  (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.033) « « « « « « « « 
Moderate exposure dummy « « « « -0.004 0.107*** -0.003*** 0.018*** « « « « 
  « « « « (0.165) (0.001) (0.375) (0.002) « « « « 
High exposure dummy « « « « « « « « -0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.045*** 
  « « « « « « « « (0.369) (0.968) (0.855) (0.000) 
Firm age 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001*** 0.001 -0.001* 0.000 -0.001*** 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001*** 
  (0.280) (0.124) (0.600) (0.000) (0.326) (0.074) (0.658) (0.000) (0.301) (0.101) (0.647) (0.000) 
Employee productivity 0.002*** -0.004*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.004*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.001*** -0.004*** 0.000 -0.001*** 
  (0.002) (0.000) (0.465) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.424) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.449) (0.000) 
Firm size 0.023*** -0.030*** 0.023*** -0.019*** 0.023*** -0.030*** 0.024*** -0.019*** 0.023*** -0.028*** 0.023*** -0.017*** 
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
Financial leverage -0.191*** 0.485*** -0.135*** 0.088*** -0.193*** 0.480*** -0.137*** 0.087*** -0.192*** 0.472*** -0.136*** 0.094*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Capital intensity 0.105*** -0.251*** 0.141*** -0.094*** 0.105*** -0.245*** 0.141*** -0.092*** 0.104*** -0.249*** 0.141*** -0.097*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D expenditure -0.476*** 0.320*** -0.341*** 0.529*** -0.470*** 0.298*** -0.336*** 0.534*** -0.473*** 0.367*** -0.340*** 0.523*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
Missing R&D dummy 0.008** 0.259*** 0.010*** 0.061*** 0.008** 0.264*** 0.010*** 0.061*** 0.008** 0.263*** 0.010*** 0.058*** 
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  (0.018) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) 
Product diversification -0.010*** -0.142*** -0.012*** -0.007 -0.009*** -0.139*** -0.011*** -0.006 -0.009*** -0.136*** -0.011*** -0.004 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.194) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.223) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.422) 
Exchange rate 0.036*** -0.685*** 0.013*** -0.045*** 0.035*** -0.692*** 0.013* -0.047*** 0.035*** -0.685*** 0.013* -0.047*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.079) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.080) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.080) (0.001) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept ( 1E ) -0.331*** 0.142*** -0.242*** 0.568*** -0.329*** 0.177*** -0.241*** 0.579*** -0.330*** 0.149*** -0.242*** 0.570*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Regression statistics 
   
  
   
  
   
  
Number of observations 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 18,838 
Number of acquiring firms 9,419 9,419 9,419 9,419 9,419 9,419 9,419 9,419 9,419 9,419 9,419 9,419 
Wald Chi-squared statistic 1,221.81 2,288.85 1,860.18 3,487.59 1,202.99 2,288.30 1,858.90 3,488.10 1,193.95 2,287.92 1,852.22 3,523.59 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
R-squared: Within 0.087 0.036 0.072 0.050 0.085 0.033 0.070 0.048 0.085 0.033 0.071 0.050 
                     Between 0.222 0.140 0.230 0.223 0.221 0.140 0.229 0.223 0.221 0.139 0.229 0.225 
                     Overall 0.178 0.114 0.185 0.193 0.177 0.114 0.184 0.193 0.177 0.113 0.184 0.195 
This table presents results for the average cross-ERUGHULPSDFWRQDFTXLULQJILUPV¶ILQDQFLDOSHUIRUPDQFH7KHGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOHLQ0RGHOVDQGLVUHWXUQRQDVVHW52$0RGHOVDQGLV7RELQ¶V4LQ0RGHOV7, and 11 is 
operating cash flow ratio; in Models 4, 8, and 12 is operating cost ratio. The foreign acquisition effect is the interaction between foreign deal dummy and post-acquisition dummy. Classification of the MNCs into Low exposure, Moderate 
exposureDQG+LJKH[SRVXUHLVEDVHGRQWKHYDOXHRIWKHILUP¶VIRUHLJQDVVHWUDWLRLQWKHSUH-acquisition year. All specifications include industry dummies. Year dummies are not included because of the direct inclusion of the Exchange rate 
variable to control for monetary influences in the macro-economy. Figures in parenthesis are p-values. The standard errors are allowed to cluster by firm. ***, **, and * denote that the coefficient is statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
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Table 5: Robustness testing ± Dependent variable in all models is return on asset (ROA) 
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Models including: FAR FAR-2 FAR-3 FAR-all Purchase Equals 
B4*FAR -0.013** 
  
-0.021 
 
  
  (0.033) 
  
(0.118) 
 
  
FAR -0.010 
  
0.026* 
 
  
  (0.166) 
  
(0.098) 
 
  
B4*FAR_squared 
 
0.000 
 
0.013 
 
  
  
 
(0.890) 
 
(0.437) 
 
  
FAR_squared 
 
-0.007*** 
 
-0.035** 
 
  
  
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.035) 
 
  
B4*FAR_cubed 
  
0.000 -0.001 
 
  
  
  
(0.474) (0.493) 
 
  
FAR_cubed 
  
-0.001*** 0.003* 
 
  
  
  
(0.000) (0.086) 
 
  
B4*Post_2003_era 
    
0.004   
  
    
(0.342)   
Post-2003_era dummy 
    
-0.022***   
  
    
(0.000)   
B4*Equals_merge 
     
-0.014 
  
     
(0.197) 
Equals_merge dummy 
     
-0.020*** 
  
     
(0.000) 
Foreign deal dummy 0.004 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 
  (0.256) (0.806) (0.505) (0.828) (0.370) (0.581) 
Post-acq. dummy -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.013*** -0.018*** -0.017*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
  (0.114) (0.159) (0.194) (0.184) (0.352) (0.394) 
34 
 
Employee productivity 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Firm size 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Financial leverage -0.192*** -0.192*** -0.194*** -0.190*** -0.192*** -0.190*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Capital intensity 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.106*** 0.104*** 0.096*** 0.104*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D expenditure -0.398*** -0.395*** -0.395*** -0.390*** -0.457*** -0.468*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Missing R&D dummy 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.007** 
  (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.029) 
Product diversification -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.009*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) 
Exchange rate 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.069*** 0.038*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.334*** -0.330*** -0.329*** -0.328*** -0.373*** -0.330*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  
     
  
No. of observations 17,920 17,920 17,920 17,920 18,838 18,838 
No. of firms 9,419 9,419 9,419 9,419 9,419 9,419 
All specifications include industry dummies. Year dummies are not included because of the direct inclusion of the Exchange rate variable to control for monetary influences in 
the macro-economy. Figures in parenthesis are p-values. The standard errors are allowed to cluster by firm. ***, **, and * denote that the coefficient is statistically significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
